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Summary 
In this report, we offer guidance to criminologists attempting to navigate, and 
manage the impact of, laws that relate to the protection and disclosure of 
confidential and personal information that they gather in the course of their 
research.  
We start by providing examples of the impact of relevant laws on the practice 
of criminologists to set this work in it proper context, and then provide a 
general overview of laws relating to issues such as privacy, confidentiality and 
compelled disclosure. Drawing on this background, Section Three provides 
brief responses to Frequently Asked Questions covering the ways researchers 
gather, store, use, disclose and reuse information. We conclude by examining 
possible future developments.  
Throughout the report we attempt to illustrate how the practice of 
criminological research practically intersects with relevant laws. This 
intersection can be painful as relevant laws are by no means tailored to suit 
the environment of such research. However, our aim is to help criminologists 
and their institutions reach better informed decisions about management of 
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Introduction 
 
Criminological research often involves handling data relating to illegal or 
sensitive activities. Researchers may need to negotiate the way they use this 
data with a range of parties, including research participants, funders, clients, 
government agencies, and regulators of law and ethics. They do so in an 
uncertain legal environment and in the face of considerable recent change at 
statute and common law. This uncertainty has had several consequences. 
 
First, criminologists have been exhorted by their professional organisations and 
employers to develop an understanding of the legal regulations that govern their 
research. So, section five of the Australian and New Zealand Society of 
Criminology Code makes references to respecting undertakings of confidentiality 
and requires members to ‘comply with all legal requirements’ (Australian and 
New Zealand Society of Criminology Code s.5a). These sentiments are reiterated 
in the various national ethics codes such as the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research involving Humans (1999) and the Draft Australian Code for 
Conducting Research (National Health and Medical Research Council et al. 
2004). For example, the first consultation draft of the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Research involving Humans (2004) warned that ‘It is the 
responsibility of institutions and researchers to conform to both general and 
specific legal obligations, wherever relevant.’ (p.4). 
 
A review of ethical governance of criminology for the New South Wales 
Government completed by Mark Israel (2004b), one of the authors of this report, 
pointed to the need for criminologists to improve their knowledge of laws relating 
to confidentiality and privacy. However, considerable work needs to be done to 
provide Australian criminologists – including those who possess legal 
qualifications – with the means to do so and, for the most part, this has not 
happened, leaving government-, university- and private-based researchers and 
their host institutions vulnerable. 
 
Second, various government and research institutions have been developing risk 
management practices for sensitive data. However, these policies have not 
always been responsive to the problems associated with criminological research.  
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Criminal and civil liability in drug research 
 
One successful attempt to provide the appropriate legal background for 
criminological research occurred when the National Centre for Epidemiology and 
Population Health and the Australian Institute of Criminology commissioned 
legal research to review the potential criminal and civil liability in drug research 
associated with a heroin trial in the Australian Capital Territory (Cica 1994; 
Bronitt 1995).  
 
Section One of this report reviews the occasions when criminologists and other 
researchers have faced legal difficulties as they have sought to protect 
confidentiality, gain access to or release data. Parts of this section have already 
been or are about to be published elsewhere (Israel 2004a, 2004b; Israel and 
Hay 2006), and draw on both Australian and North American experiences. In 
Section Two, we provide a general overview of laws affecting the gathering, 
storage, use and dissemination of research material reviewing laws relating to 
confidentiality, privacy, compelled disclosure, freedom of information, archives 
and mandatory notification. This provides a basic understanding of the legal 
environment within which criminologists operate. In Section Three, we identify 
common issues of concern for researchers and the specific impact of key legal 
obligations on the running of research projects. We also propose strategies for 
managing these obligations and attendant risks. The report concludes by 
considering some of the likely future legal developments.  
This report has been written by a criminologist, Mark Israel, with a disciplinary 
background as a sociologist – albeit one with a rather under-exercised law 
degree – and a lawyer, Robert Chalmers, with extensive experience advising 
Australian university- and government-based researchers about laws relating to 
information management. The division of labour was fairly straightforward – the 
criminologist identified the problems faced by researchers and posed questions 
to the lawyer. The lawyer attempted to answer in a way that made sense to the 
criminologist. The criminologist kept asking the lawyer until he believed that he 
did. 
 
Several disclaimers normally follow legal advice. The law covered in this report 
reflects the situation in January 2005. We are covering a lot of ground over 
multiple jurisdictions and have deliberately avoided some legal jargon and 
considerable technical detail. As a result, this report is probably best used as an 
overview or a guide. Researchers would be well advised to check the detailed 
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provisions of their own jurisdictions and, where necessary, seek their own legal 
advice.  
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Section One: Criminologists, their Data and the Law 
 
When people allow criminologists to investigate them, they often negotiate terms 
for the agreement. Participants in research may, for example, consent on the 
basis that the information obtained about them will be used only by the 
researchers and only in particular ways. The information is private and is 
voluntarily offered to the researcher in confidence. Researchers can justify 
protecting confidentiality by appealing to consequentialist- (O’Neil 1996; 
Fitzgerald and Hamilton 1997; Van Maanen 1983), rights- (Allen 1997; 
Beauchamp and Childress 2001) or fidelity-based (Bok 1983) arguments. Failure 
to respect confidentiality might not only affect one research project but could 
have a 'chilling effect' on all criminological research (McLaughlin 1999). 
Consequently, in general, criminologists try to respect confidences although they 
may be vulnerable to pressure from courts and law enforcement agencies to 
disclose confidential material. This may be a growing problem as the number of 
agencies with powers to obtain such data has increased over the last few years.  
 
While criminologists have paid some attention to the question of confidentiality, 
matters relating to privacy have been largely ignored. Yet, issues concerning 
privacy arise when criminologists obtain secondary data from government 
agencies or other organisations or share material with other researchers. In 
these cases, the law places considerable and often quite complex restrictions on 
researchers’ access to and use of data.  
 
This section is based on Israel (2004a, 2004b) and examines those occasions 
when criminological researchers have faced ethical difficulties in complying or 
resisting legal requirements to disclose or protect information given to them by 
research participants.  
 
Negotiating access to confidential data 
 
Constraints by privacy legislation and policies on access to data are a major 
disincentive to establishing and maintaining longitudinal studies and using 
potentially valuable existing data sets. The National Statement stipulates that 
generally the consent of participants should be obtained for using their personal 
information by those or other researchers in future projects (NS 18.4), although 
this seems not to be an absolute requirement. Epidemiological research has the 
same stipulation. However, ethics committees can approve access without 
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consent, subject to an overriding public interest in the research, on one of three 
grounds: if it is impossible in practice to obtain consent, or gaining consent 
would pose some risk to the people who would be approached, or prejudice the 
scientific value of the research (NS 14.4). 
 
The usual scenario is one where data collected, possibly some time ago, by a 
researcher who had consent for one purpose could be re-analysed to provide 
other valuable insights, perhaps into research questions that were not apparent 
when the data was originally collected. The participants are identifiable, though 
this is not necessary for the proposed new research. For very large population 
data sets, seeking consent would be prohibitively expensive or impractical. The 
costs for the data-holder in de-identifying can be similarly prohibitive. Even so, 
many research ethics committees are reluctant to approve proposals to use data 
in these circumstances, though the risk of harm may be minimal, and the 
potential benefits could be significant.  
 
Similar privacy considerations apply to research using data linkage. Access to 
identifying information is essential for analysis from different data sets, for 
longitudinal studies where participants are interviewed more than once over an 
extended period of time, or where different variables are analysed as they 
become available. While technological advances make such research increasingly 
possible, current privacy legislation and codes make it increasingly difficult. 
Personal information may only be used to allow records to be linked without the 
consent of participants if a researcher obtains the approval of a research ethics 
committee. The committee must be satisfied that personal information will be 
disclosed only for the purposes of linkage, will not be retained once linkage 
completed, will be done with sufficient security. The committee must also 
conclude that the research has public benefit (NS 18.5).  
 
Researchers and agencies find it difficult to interpret complex and evolving 
privacy laws that operate according to different state and federal regimes and 
vary in impact depending on the source of the data. Different regimes make 
nationwide research more complex to design and conduct and less reliable 
where data are not comparable.  
 
Negotiating the release of confidential information 
 
As we shall discuss, both Bok (1983) and Beauchamp and Childress (2001) 
concluded that obligations of confidentiality were only prima facie binding. This 
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means that they cannot be considered absolute and in some situations 
researchers should contemplate disclosing to a particular person or group 
information that they had received under an implied or explicit assurance of 
confidentiality. So, while many researchers have sought to avoid releasing 
confidential information, there are some situations where researchers have 
argued that it would be appropriate to breach confidentiality.  
 
In the field of bioethics, Beauchamp and Childress (2001) developed a starting 
point for assessing whether to infringe obligations of confidentiality on the basis 
of possible consequences of a failure to disclose. Focussing predominantly on 
risks to third parties, they argued that the weight of the obligation to breach 
confidentiality increased as the probability and magnitude of harm increased. In 
borderline cases, they suggested that researchers consider the foreseeability of a 
harm, the preventability of the harm through the intervention of the professional 
(presumably interventions that did not require a breach of confidentiality), and 
the potential impact of disclosure. Of course, they recognised that ‘Our attempts 
to measure probability and magnitude of harm are imprecise in many cases, and 
uncertainty will be present.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 309). 
 
The 1997 American Sociological Association’s Code of Ethics allows researchers 
to consider breaching confidentiality if, in unanticipated circumstances, they 
received information about clear and prospective, serious harm (s.11.02(b)). 
Serious harm is defined as life- or health-threatening. Lowman and Palys (2000) 
argued that in such cases of ‘heinous discovery’, researchers should distinguish 
between the kinds of serious harm that they could anticipate discovering during 
a particular piece of research and those that they could not. In the first instance, 
Lowman and Palys argued that researchers had two options. They should either 
be prepared to hear about such activities and keep quiet, or shoudl not 
undertake the research (see also Wolfgang 1981, Norris 1993). 
 
Lowman and Palys acknowledged that sometimes researchers discovered 
information about serious future harms or past injustices that had nothing to do 
with their current research. This, they maintained, was information that they 
would be prepared to divulge while ensuring the safety of all parties and 
minimising the extent to which the confidence would be breached. As a result, 
Lowman and Palys described the assurance that they would give research 
participants as ‘unlimited’ as opposed to ‘absolute’.1 
                                                 
1  Private Communication from John Lowman to Mark Israel, 23 February 2003. 
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Lowman and Palys’ position on this point is consistent with that of Sissela Bok. 
Bok (1983) argued that people who provided information in confidence could not 
expect to maintain their right to secrecy if they acted in bad faith by, for 
example, intending to harm a third party. In the context of HIV transmission, 
Gillett (1987) termed such reliance as ‘moral free-loading’. Bok suggested that 
someone who knew of the potential harm could act to counteract the plan or, 
failing that, warn the potential victim as long as the confidence was violated only 
to the extent necessary to forestall the harm. For Bok (1983), when considering 
whether to breach a promise, researchers must consider whether it was right to 
make or accept the promise in the first place, whether the promise was or is 
binding, and under what circumstances it might be justifiable to override it.  
 
When researchers decide that promises of confidentiality are not binding, they 
may be in a position to disclose information. However, this is a long way from 
saying that they must disclose.  
 
Resisting pressure to breach confidentiality  
 
Threats to the confidentiality of data gathered by researchers may be rare but 
they are not so uncommon that they can be ignored by researchers. Researchers 
have come under pressure from various criminal justice agencies, including the 
police and the courts to divulge information. The clearest Australian example 
involved Fitzgerald and Hamilton’s (1996) work on illicit drug use in Australia 
which was compromised when one researcher was approached by a police officer 
working undercover.  
 
The undercover police officer suggested that a trade of information could 
be done: the undercover officer would introduce the ethnographer to drug 
users to interview in exchange for information that the ethnographer could 
pass on to the police. (p.1593) 
 
Fearing police might seek access to their data by getting a warrant or by placing 
fieldworkers under surveillance, the researchers suspended their fieldwork while 
they sought to clarify their legal position.  
 
Several other instances of legal threats to the confidentiality of research data can 
be found in North America. For example, although criminologists and socio-legal 
scholars were not involved, fishing expeditions for research data were conducted 
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by American manufacturers subject to lawsuits involving the drug 
diethylstilbestrol (DES),2 tobacco3 and the Copper Seven intrauterine device.4 In 
the latter case, attorneys demanded 300,000 pages of documents from a non-
profit institute that had undertaken research in the area (Wiggins and McKenna 
1996). More recently, ten American universities received subpoenas from 
tobacco companies demanding thousands of documents from studies conducted 
in the previous 50 years (McMurtrie 2002). 
 
Social scientists have refused to reveal information to government investigators 
(James 1972; Kershaw and Fair 1976; Maisel and Stone 1998) or to courts 
(Gillis 1992; McNabb 1995; Picou 1996; O’Neil 1996; McLaughlin 1999; 
McCollum 1999; Wilson 2003).5 As the following examples illustrate, the reasons 
for their decisions and the point at which they decided they could no longer co-
operate with the legal system vary considerably.  
 
In 1974, a Californian graduate student observing police patrols witnessed a 
police assault of a civilian (Van Maanen 1983). Although Van Maanen gave 
police internal investigators a sworn statement about the incident, the patrol 
officers were exonerated. The police officers sued a newspaper that covered the 
assault. When the paper subpoenaed Van Maanen’s field notes, he refused to 
show them. Van Maanen decided that while he would be willing to testify about 
the assault, he was not prepared to hand over notes that contained ‘...raw 
details about questionable, irregular, and illegal police actions with the names of 
those involved...’ (1983: 275). Fortunately for Van Maanen, the officers’ case was 
dismissed before the researcher had to face potential consequences for his 
decision. 
 
In the 1980s, a New York student engaged in an ethnography of Long Island 
restaurants was subpoenaed together with his field notes by prosecutors 
investigating arson in a restaurant (Brajuha and Hallowell 1986). 6  A letter 
written by John Lofland, Chair of the American Sociological Association’s 
Committee on Professional Ethics, was cited in court by the American 
Sociological Association, the American Political Science Association and the 
                                                 
2  Deitchman v E.R. Squibb and Sons, 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984). 
3 See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1987); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. v Fischer, 427 S.E.2d 810 (1993). 
4 Anker v G.D. Searle and Co., 126 F.R.D. 515 (M.D.N.C. 1989). 
5 See also Richards of Rockford v Pacific Gas and Electric, 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976); In re the 
Exxon Valdez Re: All Cases, Misc. 92-0072 RV-C. (S.D. Ala. 1993). 
6 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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American Anthropological Association. Lofland asserted the importance of 
maintaining the confidences of sources in a field study:  
 
Ethically, social scientists have desired not to harm people who have been 
kind enough to make them privy to their lives. At the level of sheer civility, 
indeed, it is rankly ungracious to expose to public view personally 
identified and inconvenient facts on people who have trusted one enough 
to provide such facts! Strategically, fieldwork itself would become for all 
practical purposes impossible if fieldworkers routinely aired their raw data 
– their fieldnotes – without protecting the people studied. Quite simply, no 
one would trust them...7 
 
The student, Mario Brajuha, was able to maintain his promises of confidentiality 
by negotiating with prosecutors to remove the names of informants from 
sensitive material, but not before a lengthy and expensive court battle which 
resulted in Brajuha losing his money, his family and his desire to work in 
sociology.  
 
In the late 1980s, Kenneth Tunnell and Terry Cox, two Kentucky-based 
researchers, were investigating a murder case when defence attorneys attempted 
to block their research. Threatening legal action, the lawyers demanded the 
researchers’ field notes, interview transcripts and the names of informants. 
Tunnell and his colleague ‘...decided simply to lie and tell the attorneys that, due 
to their threats, we had destroyed the tapes and transcripts in question... We 
believed a good poker face would conceal our nervousness’ (Tunnell 1998: 211). 
The lawyers dropped their demands. 
 
In 1972, a Harvard political scientist, Samuel Popkin, failed to disclose to an 
American grand jury the names of and the data provided by government officials 
who had discussed a classified American Defense Department project with him 
(Carroll and Knerr 1973). Popkin spent eight days in jail.8 In 1993, an American 
sociology graduate student, Rik Scarce, spent 159 days in jail in Washington 
State for contempt of court (Scarce 1999).9 Scarce had failed to comply with a 
demand from a grand jury that he disclose information gathered during research 
concerning radical animal rights activism.  
                                                 
7  Amici Curiae Brief of the American Sociological Association, American Political Science 
Association, and Anthropological Association (2d Cir. 1984) (No. 84-6146), at app. 1. Cited in 
Wiggins and McKenna (1996: 82). 
8 United States v Doe (In re Popkin), 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972).  
9 Scarce v United States, 5 F.3d 397, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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In the only case where a Canadian criminologist has been charged with 
contempt for failing to disclose confidential information relating to the identities 
of research participants (Palys and Lowman 2000), a Masters’ student 
investigating the deaths of AIDS patients was subpoenaed by the Vancouver 
Coroner to appear at an inquest. 10  In his interviews with people who had 
assisted in the suicides, Russel Ogden had offered absolute confidentiality 
following a procedure approved by his university’s ethics committee. Ogden 
agreed to discuss his research findings with the court but refused to divulge the 
names of research participants. Ogden met additional difficulties negotiating 
confidentiality when he attempted to extend his research as a doctoral student 
in the United Kingdom (Dickson 1999; Farrar 1999a; 1999b). In 2003, Ogden 
ran into further trouble when as an independent researcher he received a 
subpoena to appear as a prosecution witness in the preliminary hearing of a 
British Columbian woman charged with counselling, aiding and abetting suicide. 
Palys and Lowman (2003) once again argued that the subpoena would disrupt 
Ogden’s longitudinal research on non-physician assisted suicide. 
  
As one anthropologist acknowledged, ‘The prospect of having to refuse to 
respond to a subpoena or to testify clearly chills the depth of researchers’ 
inquiries’ (McLaughlin 1999: 934). Although most of the examples that we have 
discussed are not Australian, as Lorraine Beyer observed, Australian 
researchers are not immune from the threat of orders from law enforcement 
bodies and courts to disclose information: 
 
In Australia, no research into illegal behaviours is immune from the 
possibility of… research material being subpoenaed. Thus, researchers 
studying… illegal behaviours must conduct their research under 
conflicting ethical obligations. On the one hand they must fulfil 
university and other professional body standards and protocols in 
relation to safeguarding the confidentiality of research subjects, and on 
the other they are legally obliged, if subpoenaed, to disclose all research 
information, including identifying information, to law enforcement. Lack 
of legislative protection leaves not only the participants vulnerable but 
also the criminological researchers who may be open to prosecution and 
jail terms in some instances, for failure to disclose material or knowledge 
of offences obtained by them in the course of their research. (Beyer 2003) 
                                                 
10  Inquest of Unknown Female (1994) Vancouver Coroner Case File 91-240-0838. Cited in Palys 
and Lowman (2002). 
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Section Two: Laws Relating to Research Material 
 
A range of laws may have an impact on the practice of criminological research. 
These include the common law relating to confidentiality and statute-based 
privacy laws, along with general laws that can be used to compel disclosure of 
information. In this section, we briefly discuss the nature of the obligations that 
flow from these laws before returning to the specific implications for 
criminological research in Section Three.  
Laws relating to Confidentiality 
 
While laws relating to confidentiality might be more commonly associated with 
commercial in confidence material or trade secrets, they are equally applicable to 
confidential personal information such as that gathered by criminological 
researchers.11 In Australia, confidentiality obligations are primarily derived from 
the common law relating to the tort of breach of confidence, rather than being 
based in statute. There are also some statutory provisions such as the tax, 
medical, social security and national security-related legislation that do restrict 
access to or use of certain types of information but, with the exception of the 
Epidemiological Studies (Confidentiality) Acts of the Commonwealth and the 
Australian Capital Territory, they will not be considered further in this part of 
the report.  
 
If a research participant discloses confidential information to a criminologist 
then, even if there is no written or explicit oral agreement between the parties 
that the information will be treated in confidence, the researcher is obliged to 
honour that confidence. Information does not have to be in material form to be 
protected by the common law, as long as it is sufficiently identifiable. 
 
The case of Coco v Clark (1969) RPC 41 set out three basic factors that are 
usually required to establish liability: 
 
• the information must have ‘the necessary quality of confidence’; 
• the information must have been communicated in circumstances that would 
impose an obligation of confidence (this relies on a ‘reasonable person test’ – 
if a ‘reasonable person’ receiving the information in the relevant 
                                                 
11  See eg Stephens v Avery (1988) 11 IPR 439. 
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circumstances would have realised it to be confidential, that is sufficient). So, 
the obligation does not have to be made expressly; and, 
• there must be an actual or threatened unauthorised use of that information 
to the detriment of the party who originally communicated it. 
 
A research participant is entitled to take action to stop the unauthorised and 
unlawful use or disclosure of confidential information obtained by a researcher. 
In addition, a participant can take action against any third party recipients of 
such information, as anyone who receives confidential information from another 
person who has breached confidence can be restrained from using or disclosing 
the information once they have knowledge (actual or constructive) that the 
information is confidential and its use is not authorised.12 
 
However, obligations of confidence are not absolute. Certain defences and 
exceptions may apply, and courts and other agencies have special powers to 
compel disclosure of information. As commentary in the Human Research Ethics 
Handbook developed for the National Health and Medical Research Council 
(2001) observes, it can be difficult to maintain confidentiality when carrying out 
some qualitative research that might involve in depth face to face interviews (as 
such interviews are not truly anonymous even where identifying information is 
not recorded). Consequently, researchers need to be aware of the difficulties of 
offering participants absolute confidentiality (Israel 2004a). The Handbook 
declares that:  
 
…if legally required to testify in court researchers must do so and 
mandatory reporting of information that has been revealed by a 
participant may be required. In addition, the law does not necessarily 
protect ‘field notes’ and researchers need to be particularly careful about 




Clearly, a researcher can release confidential information if consent has been 
granted by a participant. In addition, even if a participant does not want 
information released, some disclosures in breach of confidence may be ‘justified’ 
and excused.13 In particular, obligations of confidence in relation to illegal acts 
                                                 
12  Fraser v Evans (1969) 1 QB 349 . 
13  Fraser v Evans (1969) 1 QB 349. 
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or misconduct will not be enforced.14 This might be particularly important in 
instances of ‘heinous discovery’. However, it would be extremely awkward for 
future researchers if criminologists routinely relied on such a defence in breach 
of an obligation of confidence to a participant. We would be saying to research 
participants: ‘I am a criminologist, undertaking research on criminal activities. I 
promise to keep information that you provide confidential, unless it relates to 
illegal acts.’  
 
Alternatively, a breach of confidence may be excused where the public interest in 
publication outweighs the public interest in confidentiality. However, this 
requires a matter of real importance, not prurient interest. 15  It is an open 
question as to how broadly this defence would be applied in Australia. While it 
would be safest to use disclosure to the ‘proper authorities’ as a first step (Cica 
1994; McKeough and Stewart 2002), ultimately a whistleblower may be justified 
in going public on a matter of public interest.16 
 
Confidentiality Agreements and Provisions 
 
People exchanging confidential information often use contracts to supplement 
the laws relating to confidential information and to specify the information that 
will be subject to defined obligations of confidence. In research projects, 
researchers may provide specific undertakings about confidentiality. These may 
be provided either orally or written into a consent form or a research agreement 
or even a research funding contract. Such undertakings may become relevant if 
a researcher wants to use the law to resist subpoena actions or restrict the 
scope of use of information that he or she is required to be supplied. One 
Canadian criminologist charged with contempt for failing to disclose confidential 
information relating to the identities of research participants (Palys and Lowman 
2000) won his case on the basis that the information had been obtained in 
confidence, confidentiality was essential to the research relationship, that the 
research was socially valuable, and that the harm of breaching confidentiality 
outweighed the benefit to be gained by disclosure – the Wigmore test (Nelson and 
Hedrick 1983; Traynor 1996; and see Lowman and Palys 2001; Lindgren 2002). 
However, there is no reported Australian case law supporting a clear ‘researcher 
privilege’ and even in North America there are significant questions over its 
                                                 
14  Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113; Initial Services v Putterill (1968) 1 QB 396. 
15  Lion Labs v Evans (1984) 2 All ER 417; X v Y (1987) 13 IPR 202.  
16  Some statutory protection for whistleblowers confers immunity for ‘appropriate’ disclosures of 
public interest information by public officials, subject to many qualifications.  
 18  
existence and breadth, with recent decisions more commonly rejecting a specific 
privilege but taking confidentiality issues into account along with other factors.17 
 
As researchers, we need to be aware of the implications of the formal agreements 
we make. We have a stark choice – comply or risk the consequences of 
contravention. Such agreements may displace most of the common law and 
equitable rules relating to confidentiality (though not all agreements do so and 
some explicitly preserve such general obligations). However, researchers and 
research participants cannot rely on the provisions of a confidentiality 
agreement between the discloser and recipient to avoid making disclosures that 
are legally compelled or block those that are legally permissible under the public 
interest defences. 
 
In short, researchers who receive information under such agreements need to 
ensure that those agreements contain adequate general categories of exemption 
and that they do not inadvertently restrict researchers from using or disclosing 
information that they would otherwise have a legitimate entitlement to use such 
as information in the public domain or already known to the researcher.  
 
Epidemiological Studies (Confidentiality) Acts 
 
In Australia, some researchers may receive statutory protection for their data. 
Various acts, including the Epidemiological Studies (Confidentiality) Act 1981 
(Commonwealth) and the Epidemiological Studies (Confidentiality) Act 1992 
(Australian Capital Territory), impose a statutory duty to maintain confidentiality 
of any information concerning the affairs of another person where that 
information was gathered as part of a ‘prescribed study’ (Cica 1994; Bronitt 
1995).  
 
While few criminologists regard themselves as epidemiologists, this legislation is 
relevant to criminology because of the breadth of the definition given to the term 
‘epidemiological study’. In the Commonwealth legislation this includes research 
into the ‘the incidence or distribution’ of an ‘activity, form of behaviour, course of 
conduct, or state of affairs, that is or may be disadvantageous to, or result in a 
disadvantage to, the person concerned or to the community’ (s.3(1)).  
                                                 
17  See eg Burka v U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and 
discussion in that case of Anker v G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 519 (M.D. N.C. 1989) In re 
Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 213 (D. Ariz. 1987); Wright v Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982). 
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However, researchers have found both the Commonwealth and the Australian 
Capital Territory legislation to be quite unwieldy as they apply only to large 
government-backed projects that are officially prescribed. The Australian Capital 
Territory Act does not appear to allow disclosure of information in the public 
interest (Cica 1994) and Commonwealth laws can only cover prescribed 
epidemiological projects conducted by or on behalf of the Commonwealth 
government (Loxley et al. 1997). By 1988, ten studies had been listed under the 
Commonwealth Act, seven of which were being conducted by the National 
Campaign Against Drug Abuse. No studies were listed between 1988 and 2000 
and, by 1996, there was an 18-month waiting period for studies to be considered 
(Fitzgerald and Hamilton 1996). Lorraine Beyer’s study of high-level trafficking of 
heroin is one of the more recent studies to obtain protection under the 
Commonwealth legislation. Beyer described the difficulties that she faced: 
   
Primarily through our doggedness and determination was this 
achievement accomplished. This hugely cumbersome and time-
consuming process was the only way in which this relatively simple 
research project was able to proceed. (Beyer 2003: 3) 
 
Similarly, feasibility research on the controlled availability of opioids by the 
National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health and the Australian 
Institute of Criminology was prescribed under the Australian Capital Territory 
legislation. The heroin project finally started in 1991, three years after the 
researchers applied for funding. Since then, only four other studies have been 
prescribed under the Act.  
 
A further reason for scepticism in relation to the value of state or territory based 
legislation like the Epidemiological Studies (Confidentiality) Act 1992 is that the 
protection it purports to offer may not be legally effective. In the case of 
Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [No 2] [2000] FCA 1010, Von Doussa J held that the 
prohibition of disclosure of certain information contained in the Aboriginal 
Heritage Act 1983 (South Australia) was inconsistent with the Commonwealth 
Evidence Act, and hence invalid to the extent of that inconsistency (under 
section 109 of the Constitution). 
 




Laws relating to the privacy of personal information may overlap with 
confidentiality obligations, providing protection for the same subject matter. 
However, the potential implications of privacy controls for research are less well 
understood than those relating to confidentiality. 
 
Australia has a complex and inconsistent set of statutory privacy laws and 
administrative rules, operating at the Commonwealth and State and Territory 
levels. These include the: Privacy Act 1988 (Commonwealth) and related 
guidelines issued by the Privacy Commissioner; 18  Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (New South Wales); Information Privacy Act 
2000 (Victoria); Information Act 2002 (Northern Territory); and the mixture of 
administrative controls and guidelines largely based on the Information Privacy 
Principles embodied in the Commonwealth Privacy Act applied in Queensland,19 
South Australia 20  and Tasmania 21  (none of which have significant privacy 
statutes). There is also a range of special controls on certain types of 
information, including material relating to health, tax and credit details.  
 
Most of these laws have been developed to govern the use of personal 
information held by government departments and agencies in their routine 
processing of government business and transactions with individuals.22 While 
the laws do cover personal information held by research bodies, the fit is 
awkward as the controls are not well designed for research data.  
These laws are primarily directed at ‘information privacy’, protecting information 
about people, rather than extending privacy rights more generally. They set 
down basic standards to be applied to the collection, storage, use and disclosure 
of ‘personal information’. Personal information is defined in the Commonwealth 
Act as ‘information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming 
part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material 
                                                 
18  For further information on the Commonwealth privacy laws see http://www.privacy.gov.au. 
19  Administrative Information Standards, approved by Cabinet on 10 September 2001. 
20  See Information Privacy Principles introduced by means of a Cabinet Administrative Instruction 
in July 1989. 
21  Information Privacy Principles: Guidelines for Agencies, in August 1997. 
22  There are special exceptions for certain types of medical research (conducted in accordance with 
guidelines under s.95 of the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988), and the Victorian Information 
Privacy Act 2000 does contain some more general references to and exceptions for some 
research applications (see further below). 
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form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably 
be ascertained, from the information or opinion’. 
 
The controls only come into play in relation to information where the individual 
concerned is identifiable, or can be re-identified either based on reasonable 
inference or on matching with other retained coded information. So, researchers 
can avoid becoming subject to the legislation if the information used or stored is 
anonymous or permanently de-identified and the identity of the person cannot 
be readily inferred.  
 
In some situations, additional protections apply to certain classes of information 
that are deemed ‘sensitive’. The Victorian Information Privacy Act defines 
sensitive information as personal ‘information or an opinion about an 
individual’s: racial or ethnic origin; political opinions; membership of a political 
association; or religious beliefs or affiliations; philosophical beliefs; membership 
of a professional or trade association; membership of a trade union; sexual 
preferences or practices; or criminal record’. It is not difficult to see how the 
topics favoured by criminologists might fall into these categories. 
 
Depending on the particular laws and facts, a private organisation23 may be 
subject to the same laws or different but similar controls (such as the National 
Privacy Principles under the Commonwealth Privacy Act).  
 
A public research institution in Australia will usually be subject to those privacy 
controls that apply to its own jurisdiction. However, where a researcher is 
working in a different jurisdiction or accessing research data gathered in 
another jurisdiction, it may also be subject to the controls of that other 
jurisdiction. There may be tensions between the two sets of controls. The 
complication of multiple controls may also be triggered by specific contractual 
provisions in contracts relating to access to relevant data, or even in contracts 
funding the research. Research that involves the exchange or transfer of 
information across national borders may raise even more fundamental problems. 
Researchers may either have to deal with both sets of control or, where the laws 
are not sufficiently compatible, it is conceivable that such transborder transfers 
may be blocked.24  
                                                 
23  This term includes an individual; a body corporate; a partnership; any other unincorporated 
association; or a trust – but excludes certain small businesses, political parties, Commonwealth 
Government agencies and State or Territory authorities and prescribed instrumentalities of a 
State or Territory. 
24  See discussion below of the Victorian Information Privacy Act 2000, which controls disclosure of 
data across the Victorian border. See also Principle 9 (Transborder data flows) of the National 
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The National Statement requires that a Human Research Ethics Committee ‘be 
satisfied that the research proposal conforms with all Commonwealth, State or 
Territory privacy legislation or codes of practice’ (NS 18.1). It indicates that an 
acceptable standard of protection of personal information is conformity with the 
Information Privacy Principles of the Privacy Act 1998 (Commonwealth) 
(NS 18.2). The National Statement also indicates that ‘where personal 
information about research participants or a collectivity is collected, stored, 
accessed, used or disposed of, a researcher must strive to ensure that the 
privacy and confidentiality of participants and/or the collectivity are respected, 
and any specific agreements made with the participants or the collectivity are to 
be fulfilled’ (NS 1.19). 
 
The potential implications for researchers that flow from the Commonwealth 
Information Privacy Principles and the Victorian Information Privacy Act 2000 
are considered in more detail in Section Three of this report, but we provide a 
brief overview here.25 
 
Commonwealth Information Privacy Principles 
Researchers can access the various principles and related guidelines on-line.26 
In brief, the key principles require: 
• proper consent from participants, including making them aware of the 
research purpose and likely end recipients of the information (IPP2) 
• that information be used primarily only for that original purpose (with 
certain exceptions (IPP10) 
• proper storage and security for information (IPP4) 
• heavy restrictions on disclosure of personal information (IPP 11) 
Other principles cover issues such as: fair and lawful collection of information 
(IPP 1); collection of relevant and complete information (IPP 3); allowing the data 
subject to have access to records about their personal information – except if 
required or permitted by other laws to deny such access (IPP 6); taking 
reasonable steps to ensure records are kept accurate, relevant, up to date, 
                                                                                                                                  
Privacy Principles (these differ from the Information Privacy Principles, which do not contain 
such a restriction). 
25  See also the commentary on privacy issues in section 18 of the Human Research Ethics 
Handbook (National Health and Medical Research Council 2001)  
 http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/hrecbook/01_commentary/18.htm. 
26  See http://www.privacy.gov.au.  
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complete and not misleading, processing requests by individuals to alter data 
(IPP 7, 8); and only using personal information for relevant purposes (IPP 9). 
 
The Federal Privacy Commissioner can permit acts that would otherwise breach 
privacy principles by reaching a public interest determination. The Australian 
Institute of Criminology was able to make use of this in 1991 in order to allow 
access to material held by the Australian Federal Police. 27  Further, ethics 
committees have the power to approve research that infringes the IPPs of the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Commonwealth) in specified circumstances. Although this 
does not appear to apply to social and behavioural research, Human Research 
Ethics Committees may approve medical and health research that does not 
conform with the IPPs if the research conforms to either Guidelines approved 
under Section 95A of the Privacy Act applying to information held by 
Commonwealth agencies or Guidelines Under Section 95 of the Privacy Act 1988 
applying to information held in the private sector (NS at 52-53). 
 
State-based privacy laws 
 
As we have already noted, a wide variety of privacy controls exist across 
Australia. We discuss some of the implications of the Commonwealth, New 
South Wales and Victorian controls in Section Three of this report. We do not 
provide an exhaustive review of these matters and researchers need to be 
familiar with the controls that exist in the particular jurisdictions in which they 
gather personal information. For example, the Victorian legislation includes 
special restrictions on the covert collection of data and on the transfer of data 
across the Victorian border. There is a special exception in relation to use or 
disclosure in relation to ASIO and ASIS requests that may be relevant to some 
types of criminological research (see Principle 2(h)). Unusually, the Victorian Act 
also provides a limited research exemption (in Principle 2) where use or 
disclosure of information: 
 
…is necessary for research, or the compilation or analysis of statistics, in 
the public interest, other than for publication in a form that identifies 
any particular individual – 
(i) it is impracticable for the organisation to seek the individual's consent 
before the use or disclosure; and 
                                                 
27  See Section Three. 
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(ii) in the case of disclosure – the organisation reasonably believes that 
the recipient of the information will not disclose the information. 
 
It is important to remain up to date as many of those controls are likely to 
change as some jurisdictions implement more rigorous and legislatively-based 
privacy controls. Apart from materials available on the web,28 there are several 
looseleaf services and other materials that discuss privacy compliance in more 
detail,29 (though they do not necessarily contain material tailored to the needs of 
researchers). Researchers should consult their own institutional policies and 




Recent case law in Australia points to the possible development of a new 
common law tort of invasion of privacy. Obiter comment by the High Court in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63 
explicitly left the door open to the evolution of such a tort in the future. More 
significantly, a Queensland District Court decision of Grosse v Purvis [2003] 
QDC 151 awarded compensatory damages for ‘Breach of Right to Privacy’, 
although that case did relate to sustained ‘stalking’. In subsequent decisions, 
higher courts have held that the law has not developed to the point where an 
action for breach of privacy is recognised in Australia – see Giller v Procopets 
[2004] VSC 113, Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 763 and 
Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCAFC 326. 
 
However, if such laws did develop, they would extend beyond simple information 
privacy, providing a broader based right to privacy. This is unlikely to have any 
significant impact on the conduct of consensual research (provided that 
researchers protect the storage and use of personal information), but such case 
law may conceivably have an impact on some observational research where 
consent is not obtained. 
 
Freedom of Information Legislation and Archive Requirements  
 
By and large, Freedom of Information laws are unlikely to require researchers to 
provide access to sensitive research data. Research material generally falls 
                                                 
28  See http://www.privacy.gov.au and links.  
29  See CCH Privacy Law & Policy Reporter; LexisNexis Privacy Law Bulletins. 
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under exemptions that exist for researchers and for private or confidential data, 
though the extent of the exemption varies between jurisdictions.30 
 
However, some archive requirements oblige researchers to retain some of their 
records, reinforcing the need for researchers to consider carefully both what 
documents they need to create in the first place, and how much identifying 
information needs to be included in them. Requirements may be statute based,31 
or flow from institutional policies. For example, s.24 of the Commonwealth 
Archives Act 1983 (which applies to Commonwealth and Australian Capital 
Territory agencies, including the Australian National University) controls the 
disposal and destruction of Commonwealth records, but does enable destruction 
in accordance with the individual administrative policies of agencies.32  
Laws compelling disclosure of information 
 
Australian researchers are not immune from general laws authorising warrants 
or subpoenas or other forms of compulsory disclosure of information exercised 
by law enforcement bodies or under court backed sanction, despite the obvious 
ethical dilemmas involved. In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the 
general laws relating to subpoenas and admissibility in the research context, 
and consider the additional powers that various agencies may have to compel 
disclosure of information. Subpoenas are considered first, prior to discussion of 
general rules on admissibility of evidence and privilege, as the question of 
compliance with subpoenas preceeds any question of the admissibility of 
evidence.33 
Subpoenas, admissibility of evidence and privilege 
 
Subpoenas are a common tool available to participants in litigation to ensure 
access to that information required to run their case. As subpoenas are 
potentially very powerful, they are subject to checks and balances and courts 
retain discretion as to whether or how they are enforced. It is possible to apply to 
                                                 
30  See the Human Research Ethics Handbook: a Research Law Collection  
 http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/hrecbook/pdf/hrechand.pdf at L31 (National Health and 
Medical Research Council 2001). 
31  For example, Archives Act 1983 (Commonwealth); Public Records Act 2002 (Queensland); State 
Records Act 1997 (South Australia). 
32  See, for example, the Australian National University policies (Responsible Practice of Research: 
available at  
 http://info.anu.edu.au/policies/Policies/Research/Other/Responsible_Research_Practice.a
sp. The data storage and retention and confidentiality elements largely mirror the Joint 
NHMRC/AVCC Statement and Guidelines on Research Practice. 
33  See Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO [1999] HCA 8 Gleeson CJ and Gummow J [16, 72] 
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have subpoenas set aside by the court or to vary their application. Subpoenas 
may be set aside if they are an abuse of process, oppressive (because they 
constitute an undue burden, are unreasonable or too vague), or lack relevance. 
However, there is no general ‘researcher privilege’, and an applicant who relied 
on the negative impact on privacy or confidentiality will not usually be able to 
avoid a subpoena, although such issues may influence the way in which the 
subpoena is applied. 
 
Failure to comply with a subpoena is a serious matter, as it could place a 
researcher in contempt of court (see, for example, the Federal Court Rules – 
Order 27 Rule 12). Any researcher receiving a subpoena must treat it seriously 
and should seek legal advice whether a court might set it aside or vary its 
application. Even if the subpoena cannot be set aside, there may be significant 
grounds for confining its application to specific forensic purposes, or persuading 
the court to impose special limitations on access to or use of the information, or 
even redacting relevant data. Such factors would be considered on a case by 
case basis.  
 
There is little relevant case law in Australia to indicate what impact subpoenas 
could have on researchers. The nearest case law relates to research conducted 
in support of (or in contemplation of) litigation. However, the example of Clarrie 
Smith v Western Australia [2000] FCA 526 is useful to consider. In that case, an 
expert anthropologist had taken notes about Aboriginal beliefs in the course of 
preparing a report in relation to Aboriginal Heritage Act claims. The applicant 
sought to avoid releasing the information arguing that the confidential material 
had been supplied to the researcher ‘on the basis of his professional 
undertakings’. In that case, Madgwick J referred to the well-known test for 
public interest privilege stated by Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 
CLR 1 at 38, and observed that confidentiality was not ‘in itself considered to be 
sufficient to ground a claim for public interest immunity (although it may be 
relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion whether to permit access to the 
materials)’. The judge permitted the subpoena to stand but reconciled the 
competing interests by restricting access to the documents and requiring certain 
gender sensitivities to be observed. Similar restrictions were applied in the 
context of the Hindmarsh Island Bridge litigation: see Chapman v Luminis Pty 
Ltd [No 2] [2000] FCA 1010. Orders were made pursuant to ss 17(4) and 50 of 
the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Commonwealth) that ‘evidence about 
the restricted women's knowledge be adduced in camera in the presence of only 
one female legal practitioner representing each group of parties in the 
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proceedings, and that the evidence received not be disseminated without further 
order of the Court’. 
 
Of course, apart from the initial issue of compliance with subpoenas, general 
rules on admissibility of evidence and privilege need to be considered. With the 
exception of the statutory protection provided by the Epidemiological Studies 
(Confidentiality) Acts, there are no specific privileges that a researcher can rely 
on that relate to the research status of their activities or records. However, the 
court does have a general discretion to exclude evidence.34 So, a judge may 
refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party, be misleading 
or confusing, or cause or result in undue waste of time. The court could take 
into account the fact that evidence included confidential communications, but 
there is no blanket or automatic protection. Even if evidence is not excluded, the 
courts also have a general discretion to limit use of that evidence. 
 
Other possible sources of compelled seizure or disclosure 
 
There are numerous other ways in which research data might conceivably be 
subject to some form of compulsory seizure, including police warrants, so-called 
Anton Pillar orders, and other statutory mechanisms that give certain agencies 
(especially law enforcement agencies) special powers. Police warrants usually 
require the authorisation of a senior police officer and any seized evidence may 
be submitted to a court. Anton Pillar orders are civil search and seizure orders 
by which any aggrieved party with a serious complaint can obtain from a court 
(in the absence of the other party) an order compelling access to property and 
the ability to seize evidence which may be destroyed. Apart from the police, a 
wide range of organisations have special powers to seize information or even 
compel responses. These include anti-corruption commissions such as the New 
South Wales Police Integrity Commission, Royal Commissions and State, 
Territory and Federal parliaments. A brief summary of some of the more notable 
agencies with such powers follows in Table One, with links to further 
information: 
 
Australian Crime Commission http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/ 
Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation 
http://www.asio.gov.au/ 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service http://www.asis.gov.au/ 
                                                 
34  see eg Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth) s.135  
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Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission  
http://www.asic.gov.au/ 
Police Integrity Commission (NSW) http://www.pic.nsw.gov.au/ 
Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (NSW)  
http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/ 
Crime and Misconduct Commission 
(Qld)  
http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/ 




Table One: Some of the Australian organisations with special powers to 
seize information or compel disclosure of confidential information. 
 
 
Carrington and the Police Integrity Commission 
  
In 1999, Kerry Carrington was summonsed to appear before the New South 
Wales Police Integrity Commission to discuss aspects of the police investigation 
into the Leigh Leigh murder case. Unusually, Byrne-Armstrong et al. (1999) 
published an article discussing what they described as ‘an unpleasant 
encounter between legal culture and feminist criminology’: 
 
When Kerry Carrington was summonsed to appear before the PIC inquiry she was 
provided with virtually no information about the purpose and scope of the inquiry 
as it related to her. What she was told turned out to be misleading. She was cross-
examined for three days by six counsel… the only purpose served by most of this 
cross examination was to afford counsel for the police (and the PIC) the 
opportunity to attack Kerry Carrington’s credibility in respect of matters the PIC 
had no intention of investigating… Fragments from radio interviews, some that 
occurred almost four years before, were quoted (or sometimes misquoted) and 
explanations sought for this particular phrase or that sentence, no opportunity 
being afforded (if possible) for her to read the whole transcript or to recollect the 
circumstances of the interview. (pp.23-4) 
 
 
There are also special investigative powers that may be available to a number of 
agencies under specific statutes. Any of these may affect criminological 
researchers, particularly those receiving data via electronic modes of 
communication. For example, the power to intercept communications under the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Commonwealth), and the recent 
amendments introduced by the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment 
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(Stored Communications) Act 2004 (Commonwealth), provide expanded powers 
to intercept stored email, SMS and voice mail (especially unread material). It is 
difficult to predict what impact the new powers will have. Indeed, while there are 
general reporting obligations in relation to the use of these powers, the detail of 
this use may not be publicly reported.  
 
Since many of these powers may have a draconian effect, they are usually 
accompanied by a set of checks and balances in their execution, and there will 
be later opportunities for appeal or judicial review. A researcher may not be able 
to resist the initial execution of such warrants or powers, but may be able to 
subsequently argue about appropriate access to or use of the information, and 
raise privacy and confidentiality considerations. Even if such arguments do not 
result in a complete removal of the threat, courts may modify the end effect of 
the orders and reduce the impact on pre-existing obligations of confidentiality 
and privacy. Of course, researchers should seek legal advice immediately if they 
find themselves subject to the exercise of such powers. 
 
In short, researchers are not above the law and there is no general privilege or 
ground under Australian law on which researchers can rely to have their 
research excluded from evidence. The potential for compulsory disclosure of 
information under court order is something that researchers should bear in 
mind throughout the research process, from design to publication. 
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Section Three: Frequently Asked Questions 
 
Many of the difficulties that researchers confront in caring for their data are 
shared across the social sciences. Yet, in many cases, researchers feel like they 
are the first to confront their particular problem. Based on a review of the social 
science literature and the experience of lawyers who work in this area, we have 
identified a series of frequently asked questions about how researchers may 
gather, store, use, disclose and reuse information. We have clustered our 
responses into three broad categories (see Table Two) that review the procedures 
that researchers are required to adopt in gathering information, the ways that 
researchers can and cannot use data, and the pressures that researchers may 
face from or through the legal system to disclose data. Using case studies, we 
also provide guidance on how to respond to the difficulties and manage the risks 
involved.  
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What procedures do researchers need to follow? 
1. What factors should researchers take into account in designing a study? 
2. How should researchers negotiate access to data? 
3. What data and methods contravene the law? 
4. What do researchers owe the people who provide them with data? 
 
How are researchers supposed to store their data? 
5. Do I have to keep records? For how long?  
6. How should I store and secure records? 
7. Do I need to de-identify data? 
 
How can and can’t researchers use their data? 
8. Can I use information gathered for one purpose for another purpose? 
9. If research is done under contract, can that impact on how I can use the information I gather? 
10. Are there restrictions on publication of data? 
11. Are there restrictions on sharing data with other researchers? 
12. How do privacy controls impact on disclosure of information to others? 
13. Can I transfer personal data across state or national boundaries? 
14. Are there restrictions on re-using data for other purposes? 
 
How can the law be used to pressure researchers to disclose information? 
15. How are researchers vulnerable to subpoenas, police warrants and other forms of legally 
compelled disclosure? 
16. Can researchers be compelled to disclose information under research-related contracts? 
17. How should I respond to possible contractual obligations to disclose information? 
18. How should I respond to mandatory notification requirements? 
 
 
Table Two: List of Frequently Asked Questions addressed in this section.  
 
Q1 – What factors should researchers take into account in designing a study? 
Primarily, will the research design (type of information sought, methods for 
obtaining, manipulating and storing data) have a negative impact on 
participants? We need to consider the potential obligations we may come under 
to disclose information (including under subpoena or contract). Given this, are 
there ways of legitimately designing an appropriate study that minimise risks, 
perhaps by enabling participants to contribute information anonymously or by 
otherwise limiting or removing the need to record sensitive identified data in the 
first place? If data can be provided anonymously, or if it is otherwise possible to 
design studies so as to avoid recording identified personal information, then 
researchers will usually avoid privacy law complications. Indeed some Federal 
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and Victorian privacy principles explicitly encourage researchers to provide 
options for anonymous participation.35  
 
Carefully consider relevant confidentiality issues at the research design stage, 
including the possible future reuse of datasets or disclosure of datasets to 
others. Ensure that these matters conform with consent procedures for 
participants. Where sensitive information does need to be recorded, can it be 
safely stored and de-identified? 
 
Q2 – How should researchers negotiate access to data? 
When collecting personal identified information, under privacy laws (in addition 
to ethics requirements) researchers first need to obtain proper consent from 
participants. It is a fundamental principle in soliciting information to make sure 
the individual is aware why the information is being collected and to whom it 
might be passed (Commonwealth IPP 2). This has clear implications for the 
initial briefing protocols and information sheets prepared for research 
participants. Collection of information should not intrude to an unreasonable 
extent upon the personal affairs of the individual (IPP 3). This will not affect 
information gathered in a consensual fashion, but may have implications for 
surreptitious collection of data (such studies may raise special ethical issues in 
any event).  
 
The way researchers obtain consent from participants may also be influenced by 
the approaches taken by individual research ethics committees. However, 
written consent is not the only way to obtain consent, and indeed it is not 
necessarily evidence of truly informed consent. Various commentators have 
observed that signed informed consent forms can be impractical and may 
decrease response rates or skew responses, and that voluntariness can be 
assured by other briefing practices (Roberts and Indermaur 2003; Israel 2004b). 
Consider other approaches such as verbal or implied consent, or active 
interrogation of a potential participant’s understanding of the study by the 
researcher. Indeed, it is possible that procedures other than written consent 
forms may actually improve the quality of the consent, especially if there is some 
active questioning of understanding by the researcher once an initial briefing 
has been provided (in written or other form) to the potential participant. In 
                                                 
35  Victorian Privacy Principle 8.1 provides that ‘[w]herever it is lawful and practicable, individuals 
must have the option of not identifying themselves when entering transactions with an 
organization’. This is clearly directed more at situations of government service provision, and it 
is subject to a broad cut out of practicability. At a Federal level consider also National Privacy 
Principle 8 - which requires options for anonymity wherever practicable and lawful, along with 
other guidelines from the Federal Privacy Commissioner generally encouraging anonymity as an 
option, available at http://www.privacy.gov.au. 
 33  
contrast, a signature on a form does not guarantee any real level of 
understanding, nor even that the person executing the document has read it. 
 
When designing consent procedures and information sheets (or other briefing 
protocols) for participants, consider whether these are consistent both with the 
immediate research needs and other potential future research needs. Consider 
methodologies for altering sensitive data to protect participant interests, by de-
identification or other means. 
 
Human Research Ethics Committees and Informed Consent 
 
Some researchers have argued that their ability to respect confidentiality has 
been compromised by the way that some HRECs have interpreted informed 
consent. The National Statement requires researchers to obtain the informed 
and voluntary consent of participants except in specific, defined circumstances 
(NS 1.7). Researchers are generally expected to record participants’ agreement to 
take part. Often this will involve asking participants to sign a form. The National 
Statement allows consent to be established using ‘other sufficient means’ (NS 
1.9) but this option is not explored in much detail in the National Statement and 
some HRECs have proved unwilling to sanction alternatives to formal written 
declarations of consent. In some cases, researchers interpreted HRECs’ 
insistence on signed forms as evidence of legal risk management rather than a 
desire to protect research participants (Roberts and Indermaur 2003). In other 
cases, criminologists believed that the requirement that they obtain signed forms 
would jeopardise the research, compromising assurances of anonymity and 
confidentiality (and thus creating a conflict with the fundamental obligation 
recognised by the National Statement to protect participants), reducing the 
response rate, or affecting the validity of the study.  
  
Among other things, researchers should ensure that participants have 
substantial understanding of the research, risks and potential benefits. 
According to the Human Research Ethics Handbook, this might mean that 
participants should be advised of ‘the means of protecting confidentiality’ or ‘if 
there is a possibility of confessions of illegal activity or reportable conduct, 
whether researchers may be mandated to disclose this to the relevant 
authorities’ (L17) 
 
A person who is not given sufficient information and agrees to a procedure to 
which he or she would not have agreed if adequately informed, may be able to sue 
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in negligence if he or she suffers injury or loss as a result of the procedure, even if 




Q3 – What data and methods contravene the law? 
There are few direct restrictions on data and methods, provided that these do 
not breach other laws (such as stalking laws) and receive ethical clearance. 
However, tension is created when the opportunities presented by the availability 
of data and the possibilities for its analysis must be weighed against the need to 
respect the privacy of citizens about whom the data is recorded. While 
researchers may emphasise the need to ensure the flow of information, 
inevitably the methodologies of some research projects will need to be 
compromised to protect personal information, while other projects will simply 
not be able to be conducted. So, criminologists have reported that privacy 
legislation has stopped proposed research in both the Australian Capital 
Territory and New South Wales (Israel 2004b).  
 
However, the right to privacy that Human Research Ethics Committees are 
required to uphold is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances a committee 
should consider the risk and magnitude of harm from what must often be 
technical breaches, and weigh that against the equally valid rights of others, and 
against matters that benefit society as a whole.  
 
Some researchers working with agencies that operate under Federal jurisdiction 
have been able to take advantage of provisions in the Commonwealth Privacy Act 
(1988). Unlike some state legislation, the Commonwealth Privacy Act allows the 
Federal Privacy Commissioner to determine where the balance might lie in a 
particular research project. In the case of social research, applications must be 
made by an agency.36  
                                                 
36  See http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/publicinterest/index.html  
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Federal Privacy Commissioner  
 
On two occasions, the Federal Privacy Commissioner has allowed personal 
information held by government agencies to be disclosed to the Australian 
Institute of Criminology for the purposes of research. In 1991, the Australian 
Federal Police were allowed to disclose personal information relating to 
homicides in the Australian Capital Territory to enable research to be carried out 
under the national homicide monitoring program (Public Interest Determination 
No. 5).37 Although the Federal Privacy Commissioner did consider asking the 
police to cull or de-identify files, the Commissioner concluded that it would ‘tend 
to defeat the objects of the research’ (p.4) and accepted that criminological 
research was ‘an activity which can at least at times involve collecting data in a 
personally-identified form’ (p.3). The Institute’s Director was reported as giving 
evidence that ‘it was commonplace in criminological research for researchers to 
be given access to complete files and that important studies in relation to the 
causes of crime in such areas as sexual offences would have been impeded 
without access to personal particulars in the initial stages of the research’ (p.5).  
 
Again, in 2002, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions was 
authorised to disclose 28 Commonwealth files containing personal information 
relating to serious fraud to enable research to be carried out by Russell Smith 
(Public Interest Determination No. 8). 38  The files contained psychiatric 
assessments of offenders, the names of accused persons, witnesses and police 
informants whose safety could be threatened by public disclosure. While the 
police in other jurisdictions had been willing to accept personal undertakings 
from the researchers that they would not record or disclose the identities of 
individuals or organisations named in the documents (Smith 2003), such a 
decision was not open to Commonwealth agencies because of the 1988 Act. 
Again, the Commissioner considered asking the Director of Public Prosecutions 
to cull or de-identify files, but the Commissioner concluded that it would ‘be 
unreasonably resource intensive and would likely impede the objects of the 
research’ (p.8). He also accepted that there was no other way that the research 
could be conducted and that it would be impracticable to gain the consent of 
those people who might be affected by the decision. 
 
                                                 
37  http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/pid5.html  
38  http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/pid8.html  
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In each case, the information to be disclosed, the means of disclosure, the use to 
which the information would be put, the person to which the information would 
be disclosed were all restricted, and the need for all published data to be 
anonymised was imposed (Smith 2003). In the second case, the Commissioner 
placed a further restriction on the publication of the research – it had to be 
published ‘in such a way as to prevent the information being used to inspire or 
facilitate the commission of crime’ (p.3). At the end of the process, Russell Smith 
(2003: 10) concluded that: 
 
Even with the cooperation of willing agencies, the expenditure of considerable 
resources, and plenty of time, carrying out research of this nature is not for the 
faint-hearted. (p.10) 
 
In Victoria, the Privacy Commissioner cannot authorise a breach of the 
Information Privacy Principles (IPPs). However, the Privacy Commissioner 
(Chadwick 2003) has pointed out that agencies can register a code of practice 
covering particular types of research or certain data sets as a substitute for the 
IPPs. In addition, guidelines could be developed to ensure that the IPPs are 
consistently interpreted in commonly recurring research contexts.  
 
One area of heated ethical debate among social scientists is the degree to which 
deliberate manipulation or concealment of information – involving covert 
observation, deception by lying, withholding information or misleading 
exaggeration – might be warranted in research. The First Consultation Draft 
(National Health and Medical Research Council et al. 2004) recognises the value 
of deception, concealment or covert observation in exceptional circumstances 
(s2.2). This excludes the kind of undercover research that has been advocated by 
some social scientists (Bulmer 1982). Researchers who wish to engage in 
deceptive or covert practices need to be aware that such activities would fall foul 
of privacy laws if researchers recorded personal information that allowed 
individuals to be identified (due to the lack of consent and the operation of 
principles such as Victorian Information Privacy Principle 10 (Sensitive 
Information)). So, covert observation may be acceptable, but undercover exposé-
style reporting of named corporate officers would not be.  
 
Q4 – What do researchers owe the people who provide them with data? 
At an ethical level, researchers owe people that are research participants a duty 
to avoid causing them harm. We also owe them obligations to protect the 
confidentiality and privacy of information that they provide to us. However these 
obligations may not be absolute obligations, as there are some legal exceptions 
 37  
and defences (though there would be complex ethical issues to be considered by 
a researcher contemplating disclosure in breach of a prior undertaking of 
confidentiality). Researchers are also not legally immune to various forms of 
compelled disclosure (see later). As a result, when we are discussing issues of 
confidentiality and privacy with participants, it is advisable not to overstate our 
ability to ensure these protections, or misrepresent relevant laws or contractual 
undertakings. We ought not give unqualified promises of confidentiality and 
privacy if we are not willing and able to follow through in practice (and risk 
possible contravention of laws or subpoenas in the process). Clearly conflicts 
may arise between ethical obligations to protect participants and legal 
obligations to disclose documents or information (see Q15-18). We provide 
general advice for responding to subpoenas (Q15), and that includes further 
consideration of the interests of confidential sources and study participants. 
 
Q5 – Do I have to keep records? For how long?  
Maintaining records is usually a part of good research practice. However, in 
some situations it may be sensible to design research to avoid the necessity to 
create certain records in the first place (hence reducing the risks of potential 
confidentiality and privacy complications), or at least to avoid the creation of 
records with identifiable personal information (Q1, 3). If records have been 
created then researchers need to be aware of the possible application of Archives 
legislation or institutional policies on archiving data. It is sensible to take steps 
to de-identify personal and identified information once it is no longer needed in 
that form, and the Privacy Commissioner recommends this procedure as a 
security measure.39 However, it can be quite difficult (especially in a networked 
environment) to erase all copies of digital data, and researchers should 
understand that information may still be backed up in other locations or 
accessible even if they delete a working or archived copy. 
 
Q6 – How should I store and secure records? 
Once information is gathered, it must be properly stored and secured (IPP 4). 
Researchers must protect records by securing against loss, unauthorised access, 
use, modification or disclosure, or any other misuse. Given the nature of the 
data collected in criminological research, this may require special measures 
beyond those generally applied in a researcher’s institution.40 Depending on the 
exact circumstances, these safeguards may need to be as high as that for 
                                                 
39  Federal Privacy Commissioner’s Information Sheet 9 – 2001 Handling Health Information for 
Research and Management available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/IS9_01.html. 
40  See the Federal Privacy Commissioner’s Information Sheet 6 – 2001 Security and Personal 
Information  http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/IS6_01.html  
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sensitive health data,41 – including special access restrictions on information 
systems, encryption, ‘stand-alone’42 data storage and processing, and physical 
security for hardcopy records – and should be continually reviewed in the light of 
technological developments.  
The Joint NHMRC/AVCC Statement and Guidelines on Research Practice 
(National Health and Medical Research Council 1997) provides that research 
institutions should have clearly formulated policies on issues including the 
maintenance of records, retention of data, management of intellectual property 
and confidentiality (1.3). While the statement does not have the force of law and 
is currently being reformulated as the Australian Code (National Health and 
Medical Research Council et al. 2004), observation of its requirements may be a 
condition of institutional policies or contract provisions, and in any event it 
provides a reasonable standard for general reference. More particularly the 
statement details further requirements relating to data storage and retention in 
item 2. Data are meant to be recorded in a durable and appropriately referenced 
form and managed consistently with relevant privacy protocols and standards. 
These standards will obviously shift over time and the detail of relevant 
standards will change with (while lagging behind) technological developments in 
data storage and use. This places a fairly high burden on researchers dealing 
with personal information to ensure that the degree of protection given to such 
information remains sufficient to cope with what will probably be increasingly 
strict demands to protect personal privacy. Individual departments or research 
units need data retention and storage procedures as much original data should 
be stored at the unit level in case there is a need to respond to allegations of 
data falsification. Data are meant to be held for sufficient time to allow reference 
(examples between five to 15 years are given). Researchers are responsible for 
ensuring appropriate security for any confidential material, including that held 
in computing systems, and the statement stresses the need to pay particular 
attention if data is stored on networks.  
 
                                                 
41  See HB 174-2003: Information security management – Implementation guide for the health 
sector which is based on and interprets AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001-Information Technology-
Code of Practice for Information Security. Note that AS4400-1995 ‘Personal privacy protection in 
health care information systems’, a standard referred to in many privacy information sheets, 
appears now to have been withdrawn by Standards Australia from publication. 
42  Remote from (and not connected to) usual data networks used for general academic purposes. 
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Q7 – Do I need to de-identify data? 
In Victoria, in addition to the types of general controls discussed under the 
Commonwealth principles, there is a further requirement on data security – 
(Principle 4.2): ‘An organisation must take reasonable steps to destroy or 
permanently de-identify personal information if it is no longer needed for any 
purpose.’ While subject to a fairly broad exemption that would permit retention 
for reference and archive purposes as well as further permitted research 
purposes, this does put an ongoing obligation on affected researchers to review 
retained data and destroy or de-identify it if no longer required. 
 
Q8 – Can I use information gathered for one purpose for another purpose?  
If a record that contains personal information was obtained for a particular 
purpose then under privacy laws it cannot be used for any other purpose (IPP 
10) unless the individual concerned has consented to such use or the use falls 
under certain exceptions. Those exceptions include: where the record-keeper 
reasonably believes that such use is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and 
imminent threat to the life or health of the individual concerned or another 
person; such use is required or authorised by or under law; such use is 
reasonably necessary for enforcement of the criminal law or of a law imposing a 
financial penalty, or the purpose for which the information is used is directly 
related to the purpose for which the information was obtained. 
This control may have a significant impact on the re-use of information originally 
gathered for another purpose. Additional use may require further consent from 
the relevant individuals, unless the new purpose can be seen to be ‘directly 
related to the purpose for which the information was obtained’. While from an 
ethical perspective a research ethics committee can approve data being used for 
later (possibly not directly related) research purposes, a commitee has no 
authority to absolve breaches of statutorily based privacy principles. 
Q9 – If research is done under contract, can that impact on how I can use the 
information I gather? 
If work has been done under contract then consider what impact that contract 
might have through, for example, additional privacy and confidentiality controls, 
obligations to record/disclose data, and intellectual property issues. Researchers 
should try to amend any contract terms and conditions that might be 
inconsistent with their research design or implementation prior to execution. 
After the contract is signed, researchers should remember the relevant contract 
terms and not simply ‘file and forget’ those obligations. Pass information about 
key provisions onto others involved in conducting the research. 
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Q10 – Are there restrictions on publication of data? 
Obviously, publication of confidential or private information must be avoided 
unless consent is obtained. De-identified data summaries and resultant 
conclusions and discussion may not pose any publication problems in relation 
to such issues, unless there is a risk of re-identification, by foreseeable data 
matching, inference or otherwise. 
 
Q11 – Are there restrictions on sharing data with other researchers? 
Consider whether the original terms of acquisition of the information permit this. 
Is it consistent with past undertakings of confidentiality, privacy, or limitations 
on the purpose for which the data was acquired? Again, thinking ahead at the 
outset to the possibility or necessity for such data sharing and clearing it with 
participants can head off later problems. If data is provided to other researchers, 
then (depending on sensitivity and relevant laws and undertakings) it may need 
to be provided under conditions that control the nature and extent of use, and 
compel the recipient to observe relevant privacy and confidentiality laws and 
undertakings. This may require a formal confidentiality agreement. 
 
Q12 – How do privacy controls impact on disclosure of information to others? 
IPP 11 heavily restricts disclosure of personal information and may prevent 
disclosure of information to third parties for research purposes. This can have 
several consequences. Researchers may be unable to obtain information from 
otherwise willing providers, or may be unable to engage in multi-centre or 
derivative research projects. Researchers are not permitted to disclose personal 
information to others unless: the participant is reasonably likely to have been 
aware that information of that kind is usually passed on to such recipients; the 
participant has consented to the disclosure; or the other exceptions already 
discussed in relation to IPP 10 apply. 
A person to whom personal information is disclosed under IPP 11 must not use 
or disclose the information for a purpose other than the purpose for which the 
information was given. 
Record keepers may also be subject to administrative obligations that require 
them to maintain publicly accessible records about the general nature of 
personal information they keep (IPP 5). The type of records that must be 
maintained include: the nature of the records of personal information kept; the 
purpose for which each type of record is kept; the classes of individuals about 
whom records are kept; the period for which each type of record is kept; the 
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persons who are entitled to have access to personal information and the 
conditions under which they are entitled to have that access; and the steps that 
should be taken by persons wishing to obtain access. These must be made 
available for inspection by members of the public and a copy must be given to 
the Privacy Commissioner annually. In a sensitive research context such as 
criminology, full compliance with these controls will be difficult and may be 
undesirable from a broader privacy perspective. However, in relation to 
consensual research, it seems unlikely that compliance failures would trigger 
complaints from the participants involved. 
 
Q13 – Can I transfer personal data across state or national boundaries? 
Victorian Privacy Principle 9 (Transborder Data Flows) provides that data can 
only be transferred between jurisdictions if: there is a reasonable belief that the 
recipient is subject to a law, binding scheme or contract which effectively 
upholds principles for fair handling of the information that are substantially 
similar to the (Victorian) Information Privacy Principles (whether the 
Commonwealth principles would be sufficiently similar is not clear); or with 
consent from the individual and the disclosing organisation has taken 
reasonable steps to ensure that the information will not be held, used or 
disclosed by the recipient inconsistently with the (Victorian) Information Privacy 
Principles. 
Similar privacy restrictions may complicate transborder data flows across 
country borders. This is certainly an issue in relation to personal information 
sent out of Europe, and out of a number of other jurisdictions throughout the 
world that have followed a European approach. 
 
Q14 – Are there restrictions on re-using data for other purposes? 
Again, consider whether this is permissible, given the limitations of the original 
data acquisition, the briefings given to participants, and relevant privacy laws 
such as those discussed above. If intentions for reuse are considered up front, 
then researchers might avoid having to acquire additional consent from 
participants (see Q8). 
 
Q15 – How are researchers vulnerable to subpoenas, police warrants and other 
forms of legally compelled disclosure? 
Several criminologists in the United States and Canada have been served with 
warrants and subpoenas, often marking the start of a stressful and unpleasant 
process for them. There is no general ‘researcher privilege’, and an applicant 
who relied on the negative impact on privacy or confidentiality will not usually 
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be able to avoid a subpoena, although such issues may influence the way in 
which the subpoena is applied, or the information is used. 
 
The best time to think about the impact of a subpoena might be at the research 
design stage. If a researcher can sensibly avoid the creation of documents with 
sensitive identified information in the first place, then clearly such problems can 
be avoided. Michael Traynor (1996) identified a range of techniques that 
researchers can use both while planning and conducting their research as well 
as after legal action is initiated. While Traynor’s recommendations related to the 
American legal system, many of his suggestions should be relevant to Australian 
jurisdictions.  
 
The planning stages Identify reasons for confidentiality  
Give confidentiality assurances sparingly  
Obtain statutory confidentiality protection, if available 
Research in progress Unlink names and identifying details of sources from confidential data 
and safeguard the data 
Comply with requirements of your institutional research ethics committee
After the subpoena arrives Consult with your management and legal counsel immediately  
Notify confidential sources and study participants when there is risk of 
disclosure 
Make timely service of written objections  
Negotiate an acceptable limitation of subpoena or move to quash or 
modify it  
Seek an adequate protective order  
When disclosure has been 
ordered 
Seek recovery for costs of compliance with subpoena when possible and 
appropriate  
Request a court order that may help protect you from liability for 
disclosure and/or require party who issued subpoena to indemnify you  
If trial court orders disclosure of confidential data, consider requesting a 
stay as well as review by an appellate court  
Develop constitutional issues and policy questions and preserve 
significant matters for appellate review  
Consider refusing to obey a final and binding court order of disclosure 
and going to jail for contempt 
 
Table Three: Strategies for Countering Subpoenas for Research (adapted 
from Traynor 1996) 
 
Researchers have acted to protect the confidentiality of research participants 
and their activities by either not seeking or recording names and other data at 
all, or by removing names and identifying details of sources from confidential 
data at the earliest possible stage. These precautions offer the advantage of 
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helping to guard data against theft or improper disclosure by other members of a 




During his qualitative research with property criminals in the United States, Ken 
Tunnell took a range of methodological precautions. He: 
 
...never spoke participants’ names during the recorded interviews, which were 
themselves quickly transcribed and the tapes erased. Although I kept an identifier 
list and assigned numbers to pertinent information obtained from individuals’ case 
files, names were not connected to the information from the files or interviews. 
(1998: 208) 
 
Working with street children in Haiti, Kovats-Bernat, an American 
anthropologist, was concerned that his notes would be used by the state’s Anti-
Gang Unit to arrest the children. Avoiding detailed field notes, at times he relied 
on a combination of ‘meticulous memorization of entire conversations’ and 
surreptitiously scribbled jottings on ‘scraps of paper that I kept in my boot’ 
(2002: 216). He urged other researchers working in dangerous places to remind 
themselves daily that ‘some of the things that we jot down can mean 
harassment, imprisonment, exile, torture, or death for our informants or for 
ourselves and take our notes accordingly.’ (Kovats-Bernat 2002: 216; see also 
Salovesh 2003, on his work as an anthropologist in Mexico). 
 
Several researchers have counselled research participants not to give them 
specific information such as names or details of past criminal events for which 
they had not been arrested (Hall and Osborn 1994; Sluka 1995; Decker and van 
Winkle 1996; Feenan 2002) or future crimes that they planned to commit 
(Cromwell et al. 1991). Other researchers have reported sending files out of the 
jurisdiction, and avoiding using the mail or telephone system so that data could 
not be intercepted or seized by police or intelligence agencies (Sluka 1989, 1995; 
Decker and van Winkle 1996; Feenan 2002; Kovats-Bernat 2002). 
 
One way that researchers have responded to demands by third parties during 
court cases to see their research data has been to offer redacted material, that is 
information where the identity of study participants has been removed. In some 
cases, such as those involving short questionnaires, redacting data may be quite 
easy. In other cases, it may place an enormous burden on researchers. For 
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example, in Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb and Sons43 in 1984, the manufacturer of 
the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) sought all the information contained in the 
University of Chicago’s DES Registry of 500 cases. The Registry refused to 
breach patient confidentiality and Squibb offered to accept the data stripped of 
identifying information. The task was described by the Chairman of the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University as ‘herculean’ (Crabb 
1996; Wiggins and McKenna 1996). 
 
Q16 – Can researchers be compelled to disclose information under research 
related contracts?  
Contractual obligations may compel disclosure in several ways. First, any 
funding contract relating to the research may contain specific obligations in 
relation to matters such as confidentiality, privacy, intellectual property rights, 
disclosure and publication. Many of these may be reasonable requirements for 
the funding agency to seek and may simply act in support of the common law 
and statutory obligations of confidentiality and privacy. To this extent such 
contracts may not pose a problem. However some obligations may, intentionally 
or otherwise, not be compatible with the intended research methodology and the 
interests of participants or other data providers. Contractual obligations may 
also impact on researchers when researchers obtain information under contract 
from a third party. This party might be a direct research participant (under a 
confidentiality agreement or as a consequence of part of a consent agreement), 
or another researcher or organisation. 
 
In their review of confidentiality issues arising as a result of sharing 
administrative data gathered as part of American welfare programs, Brady and 
his colleagues (2001) provided a range of examples that they thought should be 
specified in any written contract (see Table Four). 
                                                 
43 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).  
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• Prohibition on redisclosure or rerelease 
• Specification of electronic data transmission (e.g. encryption methods for 
network access) 
• Description of storage and/or handling of paper copies of confidential data 
• Description of storage and/or handling of electronic media such as tapes or 
cartridges 
• Description of network security 
• Requirement for notification of security incidents 
• Description of methods of statistical disclosure limitation 
• Description of disposition of data upon termination of contract 
• Penalties for breaches 
 
Table Four: Contractual Procedures for Protecting the Confidentiality of 
Individuals in Research Projects using Administrative Microdata Files (from 
Brady et al. 2001: 255) 
 
 
Q17 – How should I respond to possible contractual obligations to disclose 
information? 
Proposed contracts should be carefully drafted and evaluated from the beginning 
and adjusted by negotiation to ensure they are compatible with other obligations 
and the research methodology. For instance, it may be important to restrict the 
obligations to provide data and results to the funding agencies to avoid an 
obligation to provide all raw data. Consider for example the absolute audit 
powers available to the Australian Research Council under clause 29 of the 
conditions for 2005 Linkage Grants. 44  These allow the Australian Research 
Council to access to all material. Similarly, any material generated under the 
terms of a Criminology Research Council Grant Contract must be provided to 
the Criminology Research Council (see clause 10, and breadth of definition of 
Contract Material in clause 1). It may also be necessary to ensure the contract 
fits with other pre-existing or likely contractual obligations. For example, the 
blanket access rights referred to in relation to the 2005 Linkage Grants are 
subject to ‘any agreement to the contrary with an Industry Partner which can be 
justified to the satisfaction of the ARC on the grounds of commercial sensitivity 
(including Intellectual Property considerations)’ (see clause 29.2(a)). Therefore if 
                                                 
44  http://www.arc.gov.au/rtf/LP2005_Funding_Agreement_Website_16Dec04.rtf  
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the blanket access provisions in these terms were potentially problematic, the 
matter might be addressed via agreement between the Industry Partner and the 
Australian Research Council, or by amending the grant agreement between the 
Institution and the Australian Research Council.  
 
We would hope that any sensible argument to protect reasonable confidentiality 
and privacy interests of participants or data providers to enable research will be 
supported by the organisation funding that research. However any variation to a 
‘standard form’ research contract will usually pose delays and difficulties in 
negotiation. It can be helpful to craft any necessary changes in as simple a form 
as possible, and to clearly state the purpose and context of these amendments, 
as often the lawyers or contract administrators involved in drafting, reviewing 
and amending such contracts lack that information and so may be ill-equipped 
to deal with such requests. 
 
Q18 – How should I respond to mandatory notification requirements? 
All Australian jurisdictions have mandatory reporting requirements, requiring 
particular professionals to report to community services departments a specific 
range of activities involving child abuse or neglect. Unlike the United States, 
these provisions do not extend to elder abuse (Kinnear and Graycar 1999). The 
National Health and Medical Research Council’s (2001) Human Research Ethics 
Handbook advises that Human Research Ethics Committees ensure that 
researchers have taken account of the fact that they might uncover information 
about illegal conduct in the design of their research, have contemplated what 
their actions will be, and that they are aware of any legal obligations they may 
be under to report relevant information.  
 
The range of professionals and organisations required to report varies widely 
between jurisdictions ranging from only a few highly specific professional groups 
working directly for the court or child care agencies in Western Australia to 
anyone who has reason to believe that a child may be abused or neglected in the 
Northern Territory (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005). There is 
some evidence that some professional groups are either wrong about or 
uncertain what their obligations are under such legislation (Goddard et al. 
2002).  
 
In New South Wales, it is an offence under s 316 Crimes Act 1900 not to report 
information about commission of a ‘serious offence’. However, in the case of 
information obtained by a ‘researcher for professional or academic purposes’, a 
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prosecution can only be launched for this offence with the approval of the 
Attorney General. This makes it less likely that a researcher will be charged. 
Other legislative prescriptions about reporting offending behaviour are rare.  
 
While no jurisdiction specifically lists researchers or academics as a professional 
group that is subject to mandatory notification legislation, people engaged in 
research may find that they are subject to reporting requirements because of 
their other professional roles. Where researchers who are subject to reporting 
requirements in another capacity believe that there is a possibility that they will 
find out about child abuse, they may need to consider ways of distinguishing 
between their different kinds of work. Obviously, this can be particularly difficult 
for professionals who engage in action research.  
 
So, researchers in South Australia who are also psychologists, police or 
probation officers, social workers or teachers or are employees of, or volunteers, 
in government departments, agencies or local government or non-government 
agencies that provide health, welfare, education, childcare or residential services 
wholly or partly for children may need to make certain either that research 
participants understand the role in which the researcher is acting or that the 
researcher is subject to mandatory reporting provisions. A similar list exists in 
Tasmania. 
 
In the United States, researchers who wished to explore child abuse but who 
were concerned that they might be subject to mandatory notification used 
masking methodologies that ensured that information about child abuse was not 
linked to the informant (Socolar et al., 1995). For example, in quantitative 
research on child abuse and neglect, a North Carolina research team (Kotch 
2000) required participants to seal their responses to sensitive questions. These 
responses were then separated from other information that might have identified 
the respondent. Such deliberate engineering of a methodology to avoid the 
reporting requirements was not without its critics.  
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Section Four: Likely future developments 
 
Over the last 20 years, there have been considerable changes in the laws that 
govern and impact upon criminological research in Australia. However, the 
changes have not been uniform or consistent, and have varied in impact across 
both sphere of law and jurisdiction.  
 
The most significant changes have been in the area of privacy, although the 
various Commonwealth and state laws, regulations and guidelines are both 
inconsistent and difficult to interpret in the context of criminological research. It 
is likely that the evolution of privacy laws and codes will continue. Note that 
there is currently a review into the operation of the private sector provisions of 
the Privacy Act.45 One of the terms of reference of the enquiry is that it attempt 
to ‘[recognise] important human rights and social interests that compete with 
privacy, including the general desirability of a free flow of information’. In a 
number of the submissions to the enquiry there have been calls from 
researchers and ethics committees for simplification and standardisation of 
privacy controls and concern at their current negative impact on the ability to 
undertake research. While advocating change, researchers will need to develop 
and maintain awareness of and ensure compliance with these laws. This will be 
particularly complex where research involves the transfer of data across state or 
national boundaries. Further change may also be driven by Australia’s need to 
bring its privacy laws into harmony with those of its international trading 
partners, in particular the European Union.46 
 
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that there will be dramatic change in the 
ways confidentiality laws impact on criminological researchers. However, there 
may be an increased emphasis on contractual confidentiality issues, especially 
in the context of research funded under contract by an agency, or research that 
requires access under contract to confidential data held by an agency. 
 
This should not prevent criminological researchers lobbying for improved 
recognition of the particular context within which we operate, and the difficulties 
we can face in relation to issues of confidentiality and privacy. The problems in 
this area are obvious, and we have already discussed them: 
                                                 
45  http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/review/index.html   
46  Europe has still not formally recognised Australia’s data protection laws as being ‘adequate’ and 
providing equivalent protection to European Directive 95/46/EC. As a result, information flows 
from EU countries to Australia may be restricted. See  
 http://europe.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/adequacy_en.htm 
 49  
 
…in these days of litigation and complex privacy and ethical 
requirements I don’t think it is reasonable – never mind good policy – to 
continue to compromise researchers and the participants in research. I 
think it is timely for researchers to join together to lobby for change and 
for legislative protection… Without it researchers will continue to place 
themselves and their research participants at risk and policy and 
practise will continue to be based on restricted research that may be 
biased. (Beyer 2003) 
 
The Western Australian Law Reform Commission (2002) has also repeatedly 
called for reform to codify and strengthen the discretion that courts have to 
excuse witnesses from disclosing information in breach of a confidential 
relationship in judicial proceedings.  
 
In North America, there have been moves to codify and strengthen researcher 
privileges. For instance, in the United States, the Thomas Jefferson Researcher's 
Privilege Act of 199947 sought to protect researchers from compelled disclosure 
of research in Federal courts, and would have provided protection from Freedom 
of Information requests as well as including a specific privilege for research 
information, covering: 
 
unpublished lecture notes, unpublished research notes, data, processes, 
results, or other confidential information from research which is in any 
progress, unpublished or not yet verified, and any other information 
related to research, the disclosure of which could affect the conduct or 
outcome of the research, [or] the likelihood of similar research in the 
future... 
 
Short term legislative change to protect the confidentiality of criminological 
research data seems unlikely. In the absence of such reform, desirable as it may 
be, researchers will need to continue to approach these matters on a case by 
case basis. Some problematic issues may be able to be avoided by appropriate 
research design. However, researchers will need to be vigilant to protect the 
confidentiality and privacy of research data (at all stages of gathering, 
manipulation, use and disclosure), and meet both general legal and institutional 
governance requirements. They should also consider the possibility that their 
                                                 
47  Introduced July 26, 1999 106th Congress 1st Session S. 1437, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c106:S.1437.IS. Current status: Referred to Senate committee, read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Judiciary. 
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data will have to be disclosed under various legal provisions, and be prepared to 
argue on a case by case basis for adequate protection. 
 
It is tempting to view legal matters in isolation, but clearly the way that legal 
issues affect criminologists will be partly mediated by the ethical governance of 
criminological research. In other work, we identified the difficulties that the 
National Health and Medical Research Council and the various Human Research 
Ethics Committees have had in clarifying the relationship between law and 
ethics (Israel 2004b). Criminologists have found their research blocked or 
modified beyond recognition in the past. Despite current revision of both the 
National Statement and the Australian Code for Conducting Research, we 
believe that fear of legal risk will continue to drive this process. We hope that 
this report will help criminologists and their institutions reach better informed 
decisions about legal risks. 
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